Iran’s Africa Policy: Between Anti-Colonial Rhetoric and Strategic Interests
From April 26 to 29, Iran hosted the second Iran-Africa Summit, welcoming economy ministers from more than 30 African countries as well as numerous business representatives.
Throughout the summit, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi
emphasized that Africa’s resources have long been exploited by Western powers.
He expressed Iran’s approach with the statement: “The West wants Africa for
itself, but we want Africa for Africa.” Raisi underlined that the
plundering of Africa’s resources by Western states represents a historic
injustice and stressed that Iran seeks a win-win relationship with the
continent.
During the summit, aimed at strengthening economic relations
between Iran and African countries, the Iran-Africa Joint Committee on
Agriculture and Water Resources was established.
The first Iran-Africa Summit was held in 2010 during the
Ahmadinejad administration, when ties with Africa were at their peak. At that
summit, Iran emphasized trade and investment, development assistance, energy
cooperation, and strengthened diplomatic relations, positioning Africa as a key
partner.
Iran’s Historical Ties with Africa
With its precious minerals, renewable energy potential,
young population, emerging economies, and newly developing markets, Africa is
becoming too significant and influential a bloc to ignore. While today all
global powers are vying for influence on the continent, Iran’s interest dates
back as far as the 16th century.
Although its connections stretch much further, Iran’s most
notable steps toward Africa can be traced to the Cold War era. During that
period, Iran sought to strengthen ties by supporting African nations in their
struggles against colonialism. Tehran developed diplomatic relations and
extended aid programs, particularly aligning with countries fighting for
independence.
Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s foreign policy
shifted, and Tehran began to engage more closely with African countries both
politically and ideologically. Iran pursued strategic alliances with
predominantly Muslim nations such as Sudan, attempting to expand its influence
in both religious and political domains. In this period, Iran also cultivated
ties with Shia Muslim communities in Nigeria.
Ayatollah Khomeini openly opposed South Africa’s apartheid
regime, pledging full support to the African National Congress (ANC). Through
this, Iran sought to shape its African image around “revolution and
resistance.”
Perhaps no country has received more Iranian attention than
South Africa. Relations strengthened significantly in 1994 during Nelson
Mandela’s presidency. Today, one of Tehran’s busiest streets is named Nelson
Mandela Boulevard. Iranian media remains active in South Africa, and the
country has reciprocated with diplomatic support — most recently backing Iran’s
entry into BRICS.
Iran’s overarching message in Africa has consistently been
framed as “partnership and resistance against Western colonialism.” However,
while political and ideological ties deepened, trade relations did not progress
in parallel. In fact, Iran’s share of Africa’s vast market has remained below
0.5 percent.
The Ahmadinejad Era: Peak Engagement with Africa
Under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), Iran launched a major
diplomatic and economic opening toward Africa. During this period, Tehran
sought support from African nations at the United Nations on issues such as
nuclear power and U.S. sanctions. Ahmadinejad also aimed to strengthen
relations with Shia communities on the continent. Shia cultural and educational
centers were established in Liberia, Cameroon, and Côte d’Ivoire.
Iran’s engagement with Africa was most active during this
era, marked by frequent visits, increased oil exports, and new security and
military cooperation agreements.
By contrast, under Hassan Rouhani, relations quieted
significantly. No presidential visits to Africa occurred, though existing
activities continued.
The Revival of Ties under Raisi
Since taking office in 2021, President Ebrahim Raisi has
expressed a renewed commitment to Africa, declaring: “In the new Iranian
government, we will dedicate all our capacities to deepening cooperation with
African countries.”
After an 11-year gap, Raisi initiated a new phase of
outreach in July 2023, visiting Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Kenya. He praised African
nations’ “resistance against colonialism as a symbol of awakening.”
During his Kenya visit, Raisi described Africa as a
“continent of opportunities.” In Zimbabwe, he criticized U.S. sanctions
targeting both Kenya and Iran. In Uganda, he voiced support for President
Museveni’s anti-LGBTQ policies — harshly criticized in the West — by declaring
that “Western countries attempt to present homosexuality as a marker of
civilization.”
These three visits were far from arbitrary. Kenya and Uganda
have plans for nuclear power projects. All three states are rich in natural
resources, and Iran, like other global powers, seeks access to critical
minerals essential for energy security. Tehran also aims to export oil and
petrochemical products to these countries.
Zimbabwe is a particularly noteworthy case: in 2010, it
granted Iran permission to establish a base on its territory and even signed a
uranium-for-oil deal, though later annulled.
Iran’s Activities in Africa
While Iran seeks influence across the entire continent, it
devotes particular attention to East Africa due to its strategic proximity to
the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden. The region’s religious and
cultural makeup — including a notable Shia presence — provides fertile ground
for Iran’s soft power strategies.
Tehran has established mosques, seminaries, and foundations
in multiple African countries, especially Nigeria, to bring Shia communities
together. Much of this outreach is channeled through Al-Mustafa International
University, which has 17 branches across Sub-Saharan Africa, with major centers
in Nigeria.
Iran also leverages support from the sizable and influential
Lebanese Shia diaspora communities on the continent.
Reports indicate that Iran has provided military support to
Shia insurgent groups in some West African states, particularly in Nigeria,
where Shia cleric Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky — leader of an Islamist movement that
clashed with government forces in 2015 — has long been backed by Tehran.
Iranian media also plays a role: Hausa TV, Tehran’s
only Africa-focused channel, broadcasts in Hausa (a widely spoken language in
West Africa, especially northern Nigeria) as well as English. Iranian media is
also prominent in South Africa.
Comparing Iran with Turkey and Saudi Arabia
In shaping its Africa policy, Iran frequently benchmarks
itself against Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Despite Raisi’s efforts to expand cooperation, Iran’s
diplomatic and economic presence remains limited compared to those two regional
powers. Tehran has around 20 embassies in Africa, while Turkey has 44 and Saudi
Arabia 35.
Economically, the gap is even wider. In 2022, Turkey’s trade
volume with Africa reached $40.7 billion, and Saudi Arabia’s $45 billion,
whereas Iran’s was only $1.2 billion. Tehran aims to increase this to $10
billion within the next three years.
Arms Supplies: A Tool for Influence
Alongside high-level diplomatic and trade initiatives, Iran
has also pursued weapons transfers as part of a broader strategy. Tehran sees
arms supplies not only as a way to exert political influence but also as an
economic necessity under the weight of U.S. and Western sanctions.
Reports claim Iran has established a proxy network in
Somalia through financial incentives, using the country since 2016 as a conduit
to transfer weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen.
According to a report by the Institute for Security Studies
(ISS), Iran’s arms smuggling networks have extended to groups linked to
al-Shabaab in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mozambique, fueling instability in the Horn
of Africa.
Countries such as Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea, and Senegal have
also signed military agreements with Tehran. By fostering these ties, Iran aims
to bolster its influence in the Horn of Africa while countering isolation
imposed by Western powers.
Yet, like every global and regional power, Iran’s activities
in Africa generate as much backlash as they do support. In some states, its
weapons transfers have fueled violence and instability; in others, its
promotion of Shia ideology has raised concerns. As a result, Tehran is not
always viewed as a reliable partner.
This article was originally published in Independent Türkçe, on May 15,2024.
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