The Role of Orthodox Churches in Russia’s Africa Policy
During 75 years of communist rule—when Christianity was brutally repressed—Vladimir Putin served in intelligence. Since coming to power in 1999, he has pursued a project of religious revival across Russia. As he reshaped Russian society around an Orthodox identity, he placed himself at the spiritual center of that new theological narrative.
Putin has drawn on the Russian Orthodox faith both to
strengthen domestic social and cultural cohesion and to push back against
Western culture and post-modern values. He has repeatedly derived political
legitimacy and soft power from close cooperation with the Church.
In recent years he has also begun to export that religious
strategy abroad: using the Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument to expand
Moscow’s geopolitical influence in regions where the Kremlin seeks a
foothold—Africa chief among them.
Russia’s Africa policy and the church
Unlike rivals such as China and the United States, Russia’s
approach in Africa has leaned heavily on military cooperation—security
assistance, training, and private military contractors—rather than primarily on
infrastructure investment or trade. With the Wagner Group consolidating a
Russian presence across the continent, Moscow has even discussed forming a new
private force called the “Africa Legion” to replace or supplement existing
proxies.
Putin’s strategy is to fuse military outreach with religious
soft power by leveraging the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. In
short: military backing opens doors; the Church helps Moscow win hearts and
shape narratives.
This is a calculated move. By framing Russia as a defender
of “traditional values” and an opponent of Western liberalism, Moscow aims to
make its message more appealing to conservative religious communities across
Africa.
A battle of patriarchates
The geopolitical dimension is unmistakable in church
politics. When the Orthodox Church in Ukraine split from the Moscow
Patriarchate and later gained recognition from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of
Constantinople—and subsequently some recognition from the Patriarchate of
Alexandria—Moscow reacted angrily. For Ukraine, an independent church meant
freeing itself from a key Russian influence.
In response, Moscow took the offensive in Africa. In
December 2021 the Russian Orthodox Church created a Moscow Patriarchate
Exarchate for Africa—an institutional move prompted in part by requests from
some African Orthodox communities to fall under Moscow’s jurisdiction. That
step challenged the long-standing canonical authority of the Greek Orthodox
Patriarchate of Alexandria, which historically has been the dominant Orthodox
presence across much of sub-Saharan Africa.
Patriarch Theodore of Alexandria warned that Moscow had long
harbored ambitions to expand in Africa “because here poverty makes the ground
fertile.” Some observers, including Ukrainian theologian Cyril Hovorun, argue
that the Russian Church has entered Africa primarily to amplify propaganda and
stoke anti-Western sentiment.
At the same time, reports from the Russia–Africa summit in
Saint Petersburg last July claimed that more than 200 Russian Orthodox churches
have been opened across some 25 African countries. Wherever new churches
appear, so do associated schools, wells, hospitals and cultural
centers—creating a broader infrastructure that visibly projects Russian
presence.
Orthodoxy’s place in Africa—and Moscow’s angle
Outside Ethiopia and Eritrea, Orthodoxy is generally a
minority faith across Africa, even if its historical roots in Alexandria run
far back. Because the Orthodox Church in many places is linked to national
identity and state structures, it can function as a bridge between religion and
politics: when the church strengthens national identity, it also becomes a
partner in state building.
Moscow has seized on this dynamic to challenge the
Alexandrian sphere of influence—and to present Russian Orthodoxy as a
“national” alternative. Beyond institutional moves, some Russian initiatives
have even veered into cultural and symbolic claims: in some iconography and
public messaging, Russian churches have emphasized darker-skinned saints and
Christian figures in ways meant to suggest an affinity between Slav origins and
Africa.
Where other Orthodox jurisdictions may act more narrowly,
the Russian strategy has often been expansive and inclusive: for example, the
St John of the Ladder Church in Cape Town reportedly counts roughly 40% Russian
congregants and 60% local members—an illustration of Moscow’s effort to embed
itself in local religious life.
Patriarch Theodore characterized these moves as
opportunistic; critics argue the Kremlin is exploiting poverty and
institutional weakness. The Russian Church’s rhetoric about “traditional
values” and opposition to Western liberalism resonates with conservative
religious currents across the continent—particularly where clergy and laypeople
oppose LGBTQ rights and similar social changes.
Material leverage: pay, education, and networks
In many African countries the state does not pay clergy
salaries. Russia leverages this gap: it builds or converts churches to the
Russian Orthodox fold, covers clergy salaries, and funds training and travel.
In November 2022, the first group of seminarians from Kenya, Rwanda and Nigeria
arrived in St. Petersburg to study at a theological academy in a program
financed by Russia’s state nuclear company Rosatom—an example of how Moscow
ties religious outreach to state resources.
Declarations by officials in countries like the Central
African Republic—where high-profile conversions have been announced, including
by relatives of diplomats—are presented in Moscow as evidence of soft-power
success. Whether those conversions are organic or influenced by material
inducements is a subject of debate.
Church as the arm of state policy
Historically, churches have often served state interests by
spreading ideology and consolidating influence. Today the pattern continues.
Just as U.S. funding of evangelical churches in Africa has expectations
attached—shaping doctrine and loyalties—so too does Russian support of Orthodox
institutions carry geopolitical strings.
Moscow’s approach is understandable from a strategic
standpoint: courting political support and access to resources by investing in
religious infrastructure. The Russian Orthodox Church, in effect, acts as a
conduit of state influence. Its expansionist posture in Africa is less about
purely spiritual care and more about strengthening Russia’s image and
geopolitical reach through appeals to religiosity and “traditional values.
Sources & further reading:
- OrthoChristian:
https://orthochristian.com/158467.html
- The
Economist: https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/01/25/russias-plan-to-seduce-christians-in-africa
- European
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): https://ecfr.eu/article/propaganda-in-holy-orders-africa-ukraine-and-the-russian-orthodox-church/
- Public
Orthodoxy: https://publicorthodoxy.org/2022/02/01/russias-scramble-for-africa/
- TopWar
(Russian): https://tr.topwar.ru/65632-russkie-v-efiopii-afrikanskaya-epopeya-rossiyskoy-imperii.html
- Religion
News: https://religionnews.com/2022/03/22/russian-orthodox-eye-expansion-in-africa-maybe-turkey-as-well/
- Photo
(icon / calendar): https://www.holytrinityorthodox.com/calendar/los/June/28-06.htm
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