Poland-Africa Relations: A New Player or Just Another European?

On the 21st-century global stage, Africa is a central focus for world powers, prized for its natural resources, dynamic youth population, geopolitical weight, and its decisive role in the trade corridors of the future. This interest isn't limited to "traditional powers"; regional actors are also redefining their strategic calculations with Africa in mind. In this global race, Poland, an ambitious player from Eastern Europe, is preparing to make its entrance: a European nation with no colonial past, an "emerging middle power" blending a legacy of socialist solidarity with modern diplomacy.

With investments in unmanned aerial vehicles in Nigeria, lithium mining in Zimbabwe, and agricultural technology cooperation in Senegal, Warsaw has launched a multi-faceted African outreach spanning from the defence industry to digital infrastructure.

Following the productive tenure of Andrzej Duda, how can Poland, now under President Karol Nawrocki, differentiate itself in an arena dominated by China's mega-projects, Turkey's reassuring military-diplomatic moves, and the European Union's development programs, which are often viewed with suspicion due to Europe's colonial history? The answer lies in Warsaw's ability to leverage its historical ties while deftly navigating today's geopolitical balances.

Socialist Solidarity During the Cold War

Poland's relationship with the African continent is not new, though it long remained limited and low-profile. Its lack of a colonial past provided a relatively advantageous position for dialogue with Africa. This unique status laid the groundwork for the rapid increase in Poland's interest in the continent in recent years.

As an Eastern Bloc country under Soviet influence during the Cold War, Poland developed relations with newly independent African states based on socialist solidarity and ideological affinity. Focusing on the north of the continent, it sent Polish doctors, engineers, scientists, and other experts to countries like Morocco, Algeria, and Libya. Simultaneously, scholarships were offered to many African students for education in Poland.

Productive relations were established in the 1970s and 80s with Ethiopia, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, and Mozambique. In countries like Angola and Namibia, where civil wars had just ended, Poland supplied military matériel to the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and provided medical support and training aid to SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organisation) guerrillas.

By 1981, Poland had 20 embassies across Africa. However, with the end of the communist regime in 1989, its foreign policy focus turned entirely toward the West. EU and NATO membership brought internal reforms and European integration to the forefront. As the country's interest in Africa waned, eight of its embassies on the continent were closed between 1990 and 2008.

"Go Africa" and the New Economic Diplomacy

Poland's renewed focus on Africa became evident in the 2010s. Relations with countries like Libya and Tunisia following the Arab Spring initiated a new opening toward North Africa. During this period, Polish foreign policy was reshaped around development, diplomacy, and trade. Scholarships for African students at universities continued, and technical and development cooperation gained momentum.

The "Go Africa" program, launched in 2013, aimed to make Polish companies more active in African markets. Notable ventures included oil and gas projects in Nigeria and Tunisia, mining investments in Mozambique, Namibia, and the Republic of the Congo, and the modernization of mining technology in South Africa.

A pivotal moment came in 2016 with the visit of Senegalese President Macky Sall to Poland, which led to the reopening of the embassy in Dakar. This was followed by the reactivation of diplomatic missions in Tanzania, Sudan, and Rwanda.

In 2017, President Andrzej Duda delivered a speech at the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, stating, "Poland wants to listen to and understand Africa," signalling the new era's intent. The most striking part of his speech was a historical reminder: he thanked Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa for hosting thousands of Polish refugees during World War II, emphasising that the bonds between Poland and Africa were deeper than assumed and rooted in humanitarian grounds.

A Forgotten Chapter: Poles Finding Refuge in Africa

World War II, which began with Germany's invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, plunged the nation into a humanitarian catastrophe. Due to concentration camps, exiles, and the Soviet occupation, hundreds of thousands of Poles were subjected to forced relocation into Soviet territory.

Some of the Polish civilians evacuated from the Soviet Union to Iran were redirected to African colonies under British control due to a lack of resources. Thus, between 1942 and 1950, thousands of Polish refugees lived in over 20 camps established in Uganda, Tanzania (then Tanganyika), Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and South Africa.

These camps became organised communities with Polish schools, theatres, and churches, and friendly relations were developed with the local population. Some Poles chose to remain in Africa after the war. In the 2010s, the Polish government restored Polish cemeteries in Tanzania and produced documentaries on the theme of "Poland in Africa."

This historical memory continues to provide an emotional and diplomatic foundation for Poland's outreach to Africa.

The Duda Era: A Long-Overdue Strategic Opening

During President Andrzej Duda's tenure (2015–2025), Poland's Africa policy moved beyond a merely symbolic or ideological framework, gaining a concrete dimension focused directly on economic and strategic goals. During this process, Warsaw took significant steps to gain visibility on the continent, increase trade volume, and establish regional partnerships.

One of the most notable developments was cooperation in the defence and security sector. The sale of Warmate-type kamikaze drones to Nigeria was recorded as one of the first major sales in this field. Security technology and military training collaborations were also established with Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Angola.

Economically, Polish companies entered the African market in diverse sectors such as mining, energy, agricultural technology, IT systems, and water management. The opening of trade-focused representations in South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria boosted the private sector's interest in the continent. Mining projects received investments, particularly in resource-rich countries like Mozambique, Namibia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Prioritising relations with Africa throughout his term, President Duda made official visits to Egypt in May 2022 and to Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria in September of the same year. In 2024, he turned his focus to the east of the continent, visiting Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania in pursuit of political, economic, and military cooperation.

Poland's exports to Africa reached $3.2 billion in 2023, a 17% increase compared to 2022. This growth is largely attributed to new offices opened by the Polish Investment and Trade Agency in countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Soft Power Projects

Poland's African opening isn't limited to military or economic dimensions. The Warsaw government is also striving to increase its interaction with the continent in the cultural and digital spheres. A key part of this strategy involves projects executed through soft power tools.

For instance, the leading Polish media literacy organisation, Pravda, partnered with Code for Africa (CfA), the continent's largest civic technology and data journalism initiative, to launch the TruthAfrica project. Focusing on countries like Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Chad, Egypt, Uganda, and Zambia, the project aims to combat disinformation and expose foreign information manipulation across the continent. It is funded by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Public Diplomacy programme for 2024–2025.

In the cultural arena, Poland took a significant step by hosting AfryKamera in 2006, the first African film festival in Central and Eastern Europe. This festival reflects Warsaw's claim of a sustained commitment to creating space for African culture. The 2025 edition, themed "African Gaze: SANKOFA," will be held from November 28 to December 3. Giving greater visibility to African narratives through cinema plays a critical role in the continent's cultural representation.

Such projects support Poland's effort to build a lasting image in Africa, aiming to show that its relationships are not conceived solely around material interests. However, for soft power tools to have a lasting impact, they must directly engage with Africa's structural problems, such as social inequalities, poor governance, or the exclusion of local actors.

The Sustainability Test

Poland's relationship with Africa still contains serious asymmetries. Its current policies create local employment, but long-term structural cooperation in technology transfer and joint production remains limited.

Poland's visibility in African public opinion is still low. In some circles, Warsaw's projects are perceived merely as an integrated part of the EU's broader strategies, and the sustainability of relationships with local actors is questioned.

Like many countries, Poland also tends to view African nations primarily through the lens of investment and market opportunities. This approach seems unlikely to create a sustainable partnership model.

What to Expect from the Nawrocki Era?

The newly elected President Karol Nawrocki, who won the June election, is a figure who must continue and deepen his predecessor Duda's Africa policy. Known for his background as a historian, Nawrocki is a politician who skillfully uses historical narratives. This aspect could lead to the refugee history of Poles in Africa during World War II being more prominently featured in foreign policy.

However, the path ahead involves more than just relying on historical connections. Building a new generation of cooperation in areas like digitalisation, green energy, education, and women's entrepreneurship will be keystones of Nawrocki's African vision. He will need to develop flexible, creative projects attuned to local needs to compete with China, Turkey, Russia, and the Gulf states.

Poland's increased security role following the war in Ukraine is also noteworthy. Having become a symbolic actor of resistance against the Russian threat, the country could position itself as an alternative partner in Africa, countering Russian influence. This could make Poland under Nawrocki's leadership more visible in the West's strategic planning for Africa.

That said, the language used by Nawrocki, who holds a conservative and nationalist line in domestic politics, will be crucial in his relations with Muslim-majority countries in Africa. His anti-immigrant statements could negatively affect public perception of Poland in some African nations.

In conclusion, while historical affinities provide a strong starting point for Poland's desire to build bridges with Africa's rising powers, they will only prove meaningful if they can be transformed into equal and long-term partnerships.

Poland is neither a former coloniser nor a massive global actor; therefore, a question becomes even more critical: Will the Warsaw government be able to conduct a consistent diplomacy on the fine line between cooperation and exploitation?

Sources:

https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/03/08/presidential-visit-visit-highlights-failings-and-opportunities-in-polands-relations-with-africa/

https://filmfreeway.com/AfryKamera?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.theafricareport.com/239495/poland-signs-with-nigeria-to-replace-russian-gas/

https://klubjagiellonski.pl/2020/10/23/polish-offensive-in-africa/

https://www.africapoland.com/

https://regard-est.com/poland

https://www.indyturk.com/node/746546/tyüzde C3yüzde BCrkiyüzde CCyüzde 87yeden-sesler/tersine-gyüzde C3yüzde B6yüzde C3yüzde A7-polonyalyüzde C4yüzde B1laryüzde C4yüzde B1n-avrupadan-afrikaya-yolculuyüzde C4yüzde 9Fu

This article was originally published in Independent Türkçe on 11 June 2025.